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Abstract—Strategic restructuring of firms through investment is key to a
transition from plan to market. Using data on industrial firms in the Czech
Republic during 1992–1998, we find that foreign-owned companies invest
the most and cooperatives the least, that private firms do not invest more
than state-owned ones, and that cooperatives and small firms are credit
rationed. Given the large volume of nonperforming bank loans to firms
and the high rate of investment of large state-owned and private firms, our
findings also suggest that these firms operate under a soft budget con-
straint. Estimates of a dynamic model, together with the support for the
neoclassical model, suggest that firms started to behave consistently with
profit maximization.
I. Introduction
STUDIES of investment behavior have always occupieda pivotal place in western economics literature. On the
demand side, much of the literature has focused on estab-
lishing the relative merits of the structural dynamic, Tobin’s
Q, neoclassical, and accelerator models of investment de-
mand, for the most part assuming that the supply of invest-
ment finance is perfectly elastic. More recently, an impor-
tant part of the literature has concentrated on the supply
side, examining the effects of potential capital market im-
perfections on the investment behavior of firms.1
Investment studies also constituted a key area of compar-
ative economics, in part because of Stalin’s and other
communist leaders’ preoccupation with overtaking capitalist
economies by massive capital formation.2 The centrally
planned economies indeed reported very high rates of in-
vestment during most of their existence, although in the
Soviet bloc these rates declined somewhat in the 1980s as
economic growth slowed down and popular demand for
consumption goods became harder to ignore (EBRD, 1995).
Moreover, the technological development of centrally
planned economies increasingly lagged behind those of
capitalist countries.3
As the transition to a market system started to unfold in
the early 1990s, it became clear that the transition econo-
mies needed to invest heavily in order to modernize their
obsolete capital stock and become competitive on world
markets. The issue of how best to restructure and modernize
the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and privatized firms has
been a focal point in the policy debate about optimal types
of ownership and legal (corporate) structure of firms in the
new market economies. Theoretical studies have focused on
strategic or deep restructuring of firms in the presence of
imperfect capital markets as a key to the transition process,
and they recognized investment as a principal vehicle of this
restructuring.4 Yet, from the outset it was recognized that
only productive investment would contribute to restructur-
ing. If firms faced soft budget constraints (willingness of the
government or some other institution to provide additional
resources or otherwise bail them out),5 investment might
reflect a waste of resources as the firms used these funds for
survival rather than restructuring. Indeed, there has been
increasing concern that, while direct government subsidies
have been dramatically reduced in a number of countries,
indirect subsidies through the banking system continued for
the (former) SOEs on a large scale. Hence, although be-
tween 1989 and 1992 direct government subsidies to firms
as a share of GDP fell from 25% to 5% in the Czech and
Slovak republics, 12% to 5% in Poland and 11% to 3% in
Hungary,6 these economies experienced banking crises in
the 1990s as the new commercial banks continued to extend
loans to poorly performing SOEs and the large privatized
firms.7 The problem arose partly because, under central
planning, all capital allocation was performed by a single
bank that combined the roles of a central bank and com-
mercial bank. At the start of the transition, this monobank
system was terminated and independent commercial banks
were created, but the new banks had virtually no project
appraisal capability, some suffered from corruption, and
many were under pressure from government as well as an
“old-boys network” to continue extending credit to existing
client firms. During the same period, there were also signs
that newly created firms faced expensive bank finance or
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1 See, for example, Jorgenson (1971), Nickell (1977), Abel (1980), Abel
and Blanchard (1986), Shapiro (1986), Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen
(1988, 2000), Gertler (1988), Hayashi and Inoue (1991), Bond and Meghir
(1994), Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000), Hubbard (1998), Oliner and
Rudebusch (1992), and Chirinko, Fazzari, and Meyer (1999).
2 See, for example, Thornton (1970), Desai (1976), Gomulka (1978,
1986), Greene and Levine (1978), Weitzman (1979, Brada and Hoffman
(1985), and Terrell (1992, 1993).
3 The embargo imposed in the 1980s by western countries on advanced
technology exports to communist economies contributed to this techno-
logical gap.
4 See, for example, Grosfeld and Roland (1997), Aghion, Blanchard, and
Burgess (1994) and Blanchard (1997).
5 See Kornai (1979, 1986, 1998) for the introduction and discussion of
the concept of a soft budget constraint.
6 See Gao and Schaffer (1998) and Basu, Estrin, and Svejnar (1999).
7 In addition, Schaffer (1997) estimates that tax arrears of firms repre-
sented subsidies equal to 1% to 2% of GDP in the early 1990s.
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were denied access to bank loans altogether. (A comparative
analysis of the Czech financial may be found in a special
issue of the Journal of Comparative Economics (1997) and
in EBRD (1998).)
In this paper, we analyze investment behavior using more
than 83,500 quarterly observations from the population of
about 4,000 medium and large industrial firms located in the
Czech Republic during the 1992–1998 period. Our study is
of special interest for five reasons.
First, our work constitutes one of the first firm-level
analyses of investment behavior in the transition economies,
and it focuses on one of the lead countries that serve as
models for other countries that have launched their transi-
tions later. Our findings are hence of broad interest in the
context of the transition. Although a small number of earlier
studies have provided valuable partial surveys of investment
in the transition economies,8 detailed analytical studies of
the investment behavior of firms in these economies are
only now being performed.9 Our study stands out among
these few studies because we combine several methodolog-
ical approaches and use a longer (seven-year) panel of data.
This allows us to capture better the process of new invest-
ment and allow for construction and gestation of capital.
Second, we provide evidence on the propensity to invest
by ownership and legal status of firms, and how these
propensities vary over time. As might be expected, we show
that the foreign-owned companies invest the most and the
(domestically owned) cooperatives the least. However, we
find little support for the accepted wisdom that private firms
invest more than state-owned ones. Moreover, the relative
investment rate of the state-owned firms increased over
time.
Third, we provide evidence on whether firms face credit
rationing or a soft budget constraint and whether the degree
of rationing or softness of the budget constraint varies with
the firm’s ownership and legal status. In doing so, we test
one of the leading explanations of the sharp decline in
investment and output during the early transition period:
Calvo and Coricelli’s (1994) credit crunch hypothesis. We
reject this hypothesis as an overall explanation. In particu-
lar, we find that cooperatives and, to a lesser extent, smaller
and medium-sized private firms were rationed in their ac-
cess to credit, but the majority of firms, including the
state-owned and larger privatized firms, were not. More-
over, for many of the latter firms, the availability of invest-
ment funds is negatively related to profitability. This avail-
ability of investment funds to the SOEs and larger
privatized firms despite poor performance, together with
their high rate of investment, complements the evidence that
Czech banks accumulated a large amount of bad enterprise
loans in the 1990s. Taken together, these findings provide
strong evidence that many large firms have been operating
with a soft budget constraint.10
Fourth, because a key turning point in the transition
process occurs when firms start behaving like their western
counterparts, we test whether the investment behavior of
firms in our data set is consistent with profit maximization.
In particular, we test if the demand side of investment
reflects the neoclassical, accelerator, and structural dynamic
models. We find the behavior of most types of firms to be
consistent with profit maximization in both the static (neo-
classical) and structural dynamic framework. In the static
context, we are also able to check if the support for the
profit-maximizing model grows over time, and we find that
it does. Our analysis hence shows that, although smaller
firms suffer from credit rationing and larger ones have (too)
easy access to bank loans, in terms of the use of financial
resources they all behave consistently with profit maximi-
zation.
Finally, our study is of methodological interest because
we use a large panel of quarterly firm-level data. We are
hence able to eliminate bias introduced by data selectivity
and aggregation (see, for example, Abel and Blanchard
(1986)), reduce measurement error, take into account heter-
ogeneity across firms and over time (Bond & Meghir, 1994),
and control for the seasonal variation in investment. This
makes our work important in the context of the growing
literature on transition as well as recent investment literature
in general.
Overall, although our choice of the Czech Republic is
linked to the availability of a unique data set, an important
factor for studying this case is clearly the fact that, together
with other countries in central Europe, the Czech Republic
has been a pioneering transition economy. In the early
1990s, the Czech Republic abolished central planning and
carried out rapid price liberalization, macroeconomic stabi-
lization, and widespread privatization of state-owned firms.
It was one of the most successful countries in the region in
terms of macroeconomic stabilization, keeping relatively
low inflation, budget deficit, and unemployment rate.11 As
8 See, for example, Belka et al. (1994), EBRD (1995), and Eickelpasch
(1995).
9 For the other studies, see Lı́zal (1999a), Anderson and Kegels (1997),
and Prasnikar and Svejnar (1998).
10 At a meeting in Paris in December 2000, the governor of the Czech
National Bank announced that, in 1999a, full 32% of the total loan
portfolio of the Czech banks was classified as substandard. He stated that
“the problem has been most serious in large banks (with more than 40%
of their loans being classified at the end of 1999) and small Czech-owned
banks (more than 50% of their loans classified) . . . the public costs of the
banking sector transformation have been estimated at over CZK 250
billion, or 14% of annual GDP (plus the as yet unknown public costs of the
IPB [Investment and Postal Bank] case).” In late 2000, estimates of the
cost of covering IPB losses were up to CZK 180 billion, or another 10%
of the Czech Republic GDP.
11 After price liberalization, the Czech Republic reduced inflation to
about 10% throughout most of the 1990s, as compared to a more gradual
reduction from about 20% to 10% in Hungary, 40% to 12% in Poland and
20% to 10% in Slovakia. During most years in the 1990s, the Czech
government ran a 1% to 2% budget deficit, compared to a 5% to 8% deficit
in Hungary, a 2% to 5% deficit in Poland and a 0% to 5% deficit in
Slovakia. Finally, until the recession in the late 1990s, the Czech Republic
maintained its unemployment rate below 5%, while the unemployment
rate in the other three economies reached double digits. During the
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may be seen from table 1, the Czech Republic, like the other
economies in central Europe, suffered a significant GDP
decline in the first phase of the transition, followed by a
recovery in the early-to-mid-1990s. Unlike the other central
European economies, however, the Czech Republic experi-
enced a recession from 1997 to 1999. As in Slovakia and
Poland, the Czech investment rate fell during the economic
decline of the early 1990s and rebounded thereafter. The
1997–1999 recession also brought about a significant de-
cline in the Czech Republic’s high rate of investment.
However, during most of the 1990s, the Czech and Slovak
investment rates were among the highest observed in the
transition economies. Finally, like other transition econo-
mies, the Czech Republic experienced a severe banking
crisis in the mid-to-late 1990s. The crisis stemmed form
excessive lending to firms for nonviable investment
projects, and it was exacerbated by an underdeveloped legal
framework, weak enforcement of existing laws, and high
reliance of firms on bank credit for capital. Hence, under-
standing investment behavior of the various types of firms
in the Czech Republic is useful for gaining a broader
understanding of the investment behavior and hence restruc-
turing of firms in the transition economies in general.
II. Data and Basic Statistical Findings
The Czech Statistical Office (CSO) collected the data set
we use. It covers all industrial firms employing more than
25 people in the 1992–1994 and 1997–1998 periods, and all
industrial firms with more than one hundred employees in
1995 and 1996. The 1998 data come from a preliminary file
and do not include all firms with fewer than one hundred
employees.12 The data were collected in quarterly or
monthly intervals, depending on the size of the enterprise
and the reported variables. We have combined the monthly
and quarterly data so as to maximize the number of quar-
terly observations. In our analysis, we use data on total
gross investment because this indicator is consistent with
most existing studies of investment in the market economies
and because we do not have much information on individual
components of investment.13
Although the CSO is very professional, the data set
contained some inconsistencies.14 We have therefore per-
formed a number of consistency checks.15 In imposing these
consistency criteria, approximately 10% of the observations
were dropped, leaving us with a data set of approximately
83,500 quarterly observations.16 In terms of the total num-
ber of firms (and quarterly observations) used in regres-
sions, our data set covers 1,867 firms (6,947 quarterly
observations) in the 1992–1993 subpanel, 2,315 firms
(7,570 quarterly observations) in the 1993–1944 subpanel,
1,922 firms (6,991 quarterly observations) in the 1994–1995
subpanel, 1,969 firms (7,349 quarterly observations) in the
1996–2000 recession, the Czech unemployment rate peaked at 9.8% in
January 2000.
12 In 1995 and 1996, the Czech Statistical office temporarily changed its
methodology and collected data only for firms with one hundred or more
employees.
13 For firms with investment of more than one million Czech Crowns
(about $30,000), we have the investment figure subdivided into tangible
and intangible components. The share of intangible investment is rela-
tively small, averaging 2.4% in 1993 and 1994, and rising to 3.9% in
1995.
14 The CSO is regarded as one of the most professional statistical offices
in the former Soviet bloc.
15 These checks are similar to those used by Lı́zal, Singer, and Svejnar
(2001) and Lı́zal (1999b). They are based on logical and economic limits
and definitions: firm’s capital at the start and end of each quarter should
be positive; the average labor force in a given quarter should be more than
twenty employees; investment should be nonnegative (there were no
negative values of investment reported in our data set); production should
be positive; depreciation should be positive and less than the total capital
value; investment should be smaller than the end-of-the-period capital
stock; average wage should be higher than 2,000 Crowns/month (mini-
mum wage in 1992); sales should be nonnegative; and one-year-lagged
production, sales, and labor should be nonnegative or missing. We note
that, due to historical factors, the Czech accounting system belongs to the
Continental family of accounting systems. It is similar to (although not
identical with) the system of international accounting standards. Our
checks of variable definitions indicate that the relevant data are adequate
for our analytical purposes. Data on capital stock are unavailable for 1992,
and we thus use the 1992 data only for estimations that do not require the
capital stock variable. Finally, it should be noted that the consistency
checks revealed that data quality was improving slightly over the 1992–
1998 period.
16 One large firm that met the nine criteria reported a 90% drop in output
during the third quarter of 1993. This deviation affected the summary
statistics (see, for example, the large coefficient and standard deviation in
1993:Q3 investment-production in table 3) and some regression estimates.
We have therefore eliminated this observation from the data set.
TABLE 1.—INVESTMENT AND GDP GROWTH IN CENTRAL EUROPE
Year
Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovak Republic
%GDP I/GDP %GDP I/GDP %GDP I/GDP %GDP I/GDP
1991 11.6 0.22 11.9 0.21 7.0 0.15 14.6 0.25
1992 0.5 0.25 3.1 0.19 2.6 0.12 6.5 0.30
1993 0.1 0.28 0.6 0.18 3.8 0.09 3.7 0.28
1994 2.2 0.31 2.9 0.20 5.2 0.09 4.9 0.28
1995 5.9 0.34 1.5 0.18 7.0 0.10 6.7 0.31
1996 4.8 0.38 1.3 0.19 6.1 0.11 6.2 0.42
1997 1.0 0.37 4.6 0.20 6.9 0.12 6.2 0.44
1998 2.2 0.31 4.9 0.21 4.8 0.14 4.1 0.44
1999 0.2 0.30 4.5 0.20 4.1 0.14 1.9 0.36
% GDP stands for the annual percentage change in real GDP. Comparable methodology is used across countries. Investment includes tangible and intangible fixed assets (except for the Czech Republic, where
it includes only tangible fixed assets). With the exception of Poland, all investment data are for the entire economy, including estimates for entities not directly monitored by the statistical offices. In Poland, investment
reflects entities with more than twenty (fifty in industry) employees. Data for Hungarian 1998 and 1999 investment share is preliminary estimate.
Source: EBRD (Transition Report) and CESTAT (Statistical Bulletin of Czech, Hungarian, Polish, Slovak, and Slovenian Statistical Offices), various issues.
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1995–1996 subpanel, 1,861 firms (6,975 quarterly observa-
tions) in the 1996–1997 subpanel, and 1,799 firms (6,651
quarterly observations) in the 1997–1998 subpanel.
As may be seen in table 2, our data contain important
information about the ownership and legal status (form) of
the firms. Unfortunately, we cannot exploit this information
in a panel format because changes in the legal status and
frequently also ownership resulted in changed identification
numbers of firms. We identify firms by their identification
numbers, and changes in the legal status or ownership are
from our standpoint indistinguishable from the births of new
firms, breakups and spinoffs, or mergers.17 Although the
inability to track the evolution of ownership and legal form
over time imposes limits on our analysis, we are neverthe-
less able to exploit the ownership and legal form informa-
tion in a number of ways.
The CSO classified firms into ownership categories by
majority ownership. Hence, a firm is (for instance) classified as
being privately owned if it is more than 50% privately owned.
When none of the types of owners (private owners, cooperative
members, state, or foreign owners) have a majority stake, the
firm is classified as having mixed ownership.
The legal status reflects the particular type of corporate
governance and legal obligations associated with each form of
registration. It also captures the relative financial and bureau-
cratic ease of establishing a given type of firm. Understanding
the legal (corporate) status is important because different coun-
tries placed different emphasis on privatization and corporati-
zation of state-owned firms during the transition. For instance,
whereas the Czech Republic and Russia focused on rapid
privatization, Poland stressed early corporatization and slower
privatization of state-owned firms. The relative merits of these
different approaches continue to be debated.
In the Czech Republic, as in other central European
countries, individual, cooperative, and limited-liability cat-
egories tend to contain smaller firms that were started with
relatively low initial capital base. In contrast, joint-stock
companies tend to be larger in size. The state-owned and
mixed-ownership firms each have a similar average firm
size in both the limited liability and joint-stock legal status.
Finally, state-owned/state enterprises tend to be relatively
small, averaging less than one-half of the employees of
other state-owned firms.18 Corporate governance in smaller
firms is relatively straightforward as ownership and man-
agement usually overlap. In state-controlled firms, the gov-
ernment appoints and controls managers, whereas in private
firms the decisions are made by the largest shareholder(s).
Finally, in cooperatives, the managers are elected by all
coop members.
From table 2, it is clear that in terms of the number of
quarterly observations, the most important ownership-legal
status category is that of privately owned/limited-liability com-
panies (28,697 observations). It is followed by state-owned/
joint-stock companies (12,170), privately owned/joint-stock
companies (9,091), state-owned/state enterprises (7,154),
foreign-owned/limited-liability companies (5,995), coopera-
tively owned/cooperatives (5,461), privately owned/individual
businesses (5,355), mixed ownership/joint-stock companies
(5,226), and foreign-owned/joint-stock companies (2,218).
These nine categories, plus mixed-ownership/limited liability
firms (652), state-owned/limited-liability companies (616), and
“other firms” category constitute the twelve types of firms
whose investment behavior we analyze.
Tables A1 and A2 in the appendix give the evolution over
time of the numbers of observations in the legal status and
ownership categories, respectively. Taking into account the
fact that firms with fewer than one hundred employees were
excluded from the data set in 1995, 1996, and, to some
extent, also in 1998, we see from table A1 that there was an
expected decrease in the number and share of state enter-
prises and an increase in the number and share of limited
liability, individual, and joint-stock companies. The number
of cooperatives appears to have stayed steady or declined
slightly between the early 1990s and 1998. In terms of
ownership, the data in table A2 complement the picture by
showing that the number and share of state-owned firms
declined between the early and late 1990s, while the number
and share of foreign, mixed, and domestic privately owned
firms increased. The number of cooperatives again appears
17 Changes in firm size that do not induce changes in the identification
number are controlled for by including the capital stock as a scaling
variable.
18 Detailed descriptive tables may be obtained from the authors upon
request.
TABLE 2.—NUMBER OF FIRM-LEVEL OBSERVATIONS BY FIRM OWNERSHIP AND LEGAL FORM
Legal Form
Ownership
Private State Cooper. Foreign Mixed Other Total
Joint-Stock Company 9091 12170 0 2218 5226 93 28798
State Enterprise (SOE) 0 7154 0 0 0 20 7174
Limited Liability (Ltd.) 28697 616 9 5995 652 88 36057
Cooperative 4 0 5461 0 0 0 5465
Individual 5355 0 0 4 0 7 5366
Other 280 31 3 356 4 10 679
Total 43427 19971 5473 8568 5882 218 83539
The shaded cells denote the major ownership/legal form categories of firms that we analyze. All other types of firms are placed in the Other/Other (other ownership/other legal from) category. Firms with unknown
ownership and/or legal form are also included in the Other/Other group.
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to have held steady or declined slightly between the early
1990s and 1998.
The distribution of observations across industries, not
reported in a tabular form, is quite broad, with 15% of
observations being in the food industry, 13% in the machin-
ery industry, 12% in the metal product industry, 7% in the
furniture industry, and 6% in the processing of nonmetallic
minerals and textile industries. Each of the remaining in-
dustry groups has less than 5% of all observations.
The summary statistics of the most-relevant variables are
presented in tables 3 and 4. As may be seen from table 3,
investment-production and investment-labor ratios show an
increase over time, although the pattern is not as steady as in
the aggregate data in table 1. The discrepancy is brought about
by the fact that small firms are excluded from our microdata in
1995, 1996, and, to some extent, also in 1998, and by the fact
that the aggregate investment figures in table 1 contain signif-
icant infrastructure investment carried out by the government.
The data in table 3 also show a seasonal pattern with a
fourth-quarter peak, reflecting an end-of-the-year investment
spree.19 It is interesting that the communist-era phenomenon of
“spending funds before the year’s end” is reflected in the
investment behavior of firms well into the transition.20
Profit is defined as all revenues minus accrued costs. The
data in table 3 show that average profits were positive in all
years during the 1992–1998 period. There was also substan-
tial quarterly and annual variation in average profits during
this period, as was the variance of profits across firms in
each quarter. In an opposite pattern to investment, there was
a downward trend in profits across quarters in all years
during the 1993–1998 period, with profit reaching negative
values in the last quarter of 1993 and 1995–1998. Overall,
the post-1992 transition has not been associated with de-
clining profits, as may have been the case in the 1989–1992
period (Blanchard, 1997, pp. 64–66). This finding, together
with the consideration of the appropriateness and availabil-
ity of data, has led us to use profit as a measure of the firm’s
availability of internal funds for investment.
In panels A through C of table 4, we present for each of
the thirteen ownership-legal status categories of firms the
annual evolution of the propensity to invest, as captured by
the investment-capital, investment-labor, and investment-
production ratio, respectively. The foreign-owned/limited-
liability and joint-stock companies are a rapidly growing
group of firms, and they record some of the highest values
of the three ratios in most years. These two findings based
on microevidence make us argue that foreign-owned firms
are a major conduit of investment and innovations into the
transition economies such as the Czech Republic. The
domestic privately-owned/joint-stock companies are not far
behind the foreign-owned companies, however, and they
dominate the foreign-owned/limited-liability companies on
some of the investment indicators in several years. More-
over, although the state-owned/joint-stock companies (the
second-most numerous group of firms) do not record high
investment-capital ratios, they rank fifth out of thirteen on
investment-labor in most years and move from the sixth to
third place in investment-production between 1992 and
1998. Similarly, the state-owned/limited-liability companies
register some of the highest investment-production ratios in
the early-to-mid-1990s, while ranking relatively low in
terms of investment-capital. The low investment-capital
ratio found in state-owned firms may hence indicate that
these firms continue to report in their accounting books the
value of capital from the centrally planned period, rather
than writing some of it off as obsolete and unproductive. In
contrast, the privately owned/limited-liability firms (the
single-most numerous category of firms) and individually
registered firms rank high in terms of investment-capital but
low in the other two indicators, suggesting that these smaller
private firms operate with a small (recorded) capital stock
and do not invest heavily relative to their output and
employment. Finally, cooperatives and state-owned/state
enterprises record the lowest investment ratios for all indi-
cators in virtually every year.21
The statistics reported in tables 4A through 4C hence
indicate that foreign companies generally tend to invest the
most and cooperatives the least. The behavioral difference
between the private and state-owned firms is more complex.
Private firms clearly invest more than the state-owned ones
relative to their recorded capital stock and the private
joint-stock companies (the large private firms) also tend to
invest a bit more than the state-owned/joint-stock compa-
nies on all three criteria. However, in the early-to-mid-
1990s, state-owned/limited-liability companies dominated
all domestic private firms in terms of the investment-
production ratio, and throughout the 1990s the most-
numerous private/limited-liability companies and the pri-
vate individually registered firms tended to invest relatively
little per output and per worker. The widely accepted Polish
survey findings by Belka et al. (1994), indicating that during
transition investment is high in the new private firms and
low in the state-owned enterprises, is hence not supported
by our large Czech data set. Finally, it must be noted that
some of the highest investment ratios are recorded in the
mixed-ownership and “other” categories of firms.
III. The Estimating Framework
We estimate several equations that allow us to explore the
issues mentioned in the introduction and also permit us to
19 The seasonal pattern is much more pronounced in net investment than
in depreciation, as shown by Lı́zal and Svejnar (2001).
20 A more detailed examination indicates that the cyclical nature of
investment is systematically reflected in the behavior of joint-stock com-
panies of all ownership types and, to a lesser extent, of state-owned/state
enterprise and foreign-owned/limited-liability firms.
21 It should be noticed that a large number of small firms (especially
private/limited-liability and, in a lesser extent, private/individual busi-
nesses) did not report capital (see tables 4A and 4B). This is because the
forms that smaller firms were required to fill out for the CSO focused on
variables related to the income statement rather than the balance sheets.
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TABLE 3.—MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, AND NUMBERS OF QUARTERLY OBSERVATIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL VARIABLES
Inv./Capital Inv./Prod. Inv./Lab. Profit Labor Investm. Prod. Capital
1992/Q1 0.014 0.140 9.3 6337 653 4975 77524 559905
(0.034) (1.656) (73.1) (35855) (1899) (21544) (269293) (2490146)
[727] [2018] [2018] [2018] [2018] [2018] [2018] [728]
1992/Q2 0.019 0.167 11.3 5779 569 6160 71796 539167
(0.049) (2.264) (63.7) (29100) (1714) (28426) (260696) (2442947)
[719] [2305] [2305] [2305] [2305] [2305] [2305] [719]
1992/Q3 0.020 0.149 11.6 4524 540 6062 63127 528921
(0.091) (0.966) (51.5) (28758) (1645) (32202) (235927) (2413873)
[745] [2413] [2413] [2413] [2413] [2413] [2413] [745]
1992/Q4 0.035 0.197 18.3 5684 484 10251 67834 509865
(0.111) (1.143) (62.3) (75347) (1516) (54632) (259059) (2346213)
[736] [2548] [2548] [2548] [2548] [2548] [2548] [736]
1993/Q1 0.057 0.079 7.7 5025 531 4717 71284 371088
(0.775) (0.273) (29.2) (39474) (1625) (32206) (276324) (1628198)
[2319] [2321] [2318] [2318] [2318] [2321] [2321] [2319]
1993/Q2 0.118 0.146 12.2 3719 474 6559 66645 328661
(1.841) (1.637) (45.3) (27107) (1463) (33746) (274414) (1505538)
[2624] [2624] [2624] [2624] [2624] [2624] [2624] [2624]
1993/Q3 0.103 0.165 11.8 1953 453 6511 57370 321219
(1.409) (1.780) (43.1) (33458) (1403) (38268) (225152) (1482040)
[2714] [2714] [2713] [2713] [2713] [2714] [2714] [2714]
1993/Q4 0.155 0.181 18.4 3024 414 9217 61449 289762
(1.914) (1.218) (59.8) (39238) (1303) (56872) (266118) (1408122)
[2825] [2827] [2824] [2824] [2824] [2827] [2827] [2825]
1994/Q1 0.070 0.137 11.6 5150 347 3488 53893 281997
(0.813) (1.675) (94.1) (29256) (1087) (20776) (228914) (1432938)
[3499] [3503] [3495] [3495] [3495] [3503] [3503] [3499]
1994/Q2 0.067 0.105 14.1 4432 337 5624 58161 274200
(0.488) (0.513) (48.9) (30953) (1056) (40069) (270944) (1341419)
[3596] [3599] [3595] [3595] [3595] [3599] [3599] [3596]
1994/Q3 0.072 0.108 13.9 3392 332 5672 52641 274121
(0.981) (0.456) (47.7) (34164) (1032) (45049) (216243) (1341158)
[3634] [3636] [3633] [3633] [3633] [3636] [3636] [3634]
1994/Q4 0.134 0.190 23.6 1271 313 8315 56365 258243
(1.263) (1.366) (98.3) (29556) (991) (66671) (221359) (1297227)
[3846] [3849] [3844] [3844] [3844] [3849] [3849] [3846]
1995/Q1 0.037 0.161 12.5 5752 516 6070 89731 451553
(0.230) (2.893) (52.4) (47867) (1260) (28393) (317440) (1770985)
[2117] [2117] [2117] [2117] [2117] [2117] [2117] [2117]
1995/Q2 0.051 0.128 16.0 4986 505 8335 95449 447173
(0.304) (0.866) (48.3) (34653) (1237) (37889) (341655) (1769675)
[2150] [2150] [2150] [2150] [2150] [2150] [2150] [2150]
1995/Q3 0.041 0.127 15.2 3136 501 8857 85535 448239
(0.181) (0.666) (41.8) (41489) (1224) (48161) (296572) (1812700)
[2148] [2148] [2148] [2148] [2148] [2148] [2148] [2148]
1995/Q4 0.085 0.157 24.0 1637 499 14472 103634 455185
(0.549) (0.514) (61.2) (35154) (1212) (66702) (386065) (1796648)
[2152] [2152] [2152] [2152] [2152] [2152] [2152] [2152]
1996/Q1 0.042 0.074 12.3 5978 491 7172 110981 472241
(0.456) (0.312) (37.3) (41854) (1187) (33138) (413775) (1894208)
[2169] [2169] [2169] [2169] [2169] [2169] [2169] [2169]
1996/Q2 0.064 0.103 19.0 3435 483 12401 114792 472699
(0.520) (0.525) (69.7) (32327) (1180) (79131) (417202) (1892272)
[2177] [2177] [2177] [2177] [2177] [2177] [2177] [2177]
1996/Q3 0.104 0.118 19.2 946 474 12279 104168 466544
(2.067) (0.805) (59.4) (37750) (1160) (107420) (360790) (1834646)
[2180] [2180] [2180] [2180] [2180] [2180] [2180] [2180]
1996/Q4 0.072 0.152 27.0 4850 469 16997 118928 477815
(0.423) (0.951) (74.6) (50014) (1151) (87768) (415584) (1906272)
[2172] [2172] [2172] [2172] [2172] [2172] [2172] [2172]
1997/Q1 0.030 0.098 11.8 4165 208 3199 47918 531098
(0.184) (1.077) (56.5) (34911) (720) (22855) (291868) (2064342)
[1896] [5708] [5623] [2054] [5623] [5708] [5708] [1896]
1997/Q2 0.058 0.101 15.0 5770 200 4295 54033 279171
(0.201) (0.848) (50.3) (44793) (697) (38622) (341041) (1083281)
[2021] [5849] [5773] [2035] [5773] [5849] [5849] [2021]
1997/Q3 0.068 0.113 16.7 2887 200 4748 53530 281805
(0.220) (0.828) (65.3) (43077) (693) (37662) (333722) (1113805)
[2052] [5856] [5778] [2062] [5778] [5856] [5856] [2052]
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compare our results to those obtained for western econo-
mies. On the demand side, we use two specifications. The
first one corresponds to the basic neoclassical and acceler-
ator models of investment demand (Jorgenson, 1971). These
models are internally consistent and have been widely used
in the western context. They allow us to check if the
behavior of firms in the transition is consistent with the
profit maximization hypothesis inherent in these models.
The models are based on somewhat restrictive assumptions
about input substitutability (the accelerator model) or speed
of adjustment (the neoclassical model), however, and we
therefore also estimate an Euler equation that is derived
explicitly from a dynamic structural model of investment
demand. The Euler equation enables us to assess whether
the firms display behavior that is consistent with dynamic
profit maximization.22
On the supply side, we use a specification that allows us
to test whether the firm’s availability of internal and external
funds affects its investment decisions. In particular, our
discussion of imperfections in the newly established bank-
ing sector and the possible presence of a soft budget con-
straint make us hypothesize that the cooperatives and indi-
vidually owned or limited-liability companies, which tend
to be smaller and many of which are newly formed, could be
expected to be more rationed in their access to financial
resources than the joint-stock companies that tend to be
large and well established, or the foreign-owned firms that
can obtain investment financing from other countries. More-
over, we expect that current and privatized state-owned
enterprises may display behavior that is consistent with a
soft budget constraint.
In terms of actual specification, on the demand side we
start with the accelerator and neoclassical models, as devel-
oped and used by Koyck (1954), Jorgenson (1966), Kopcke
(1985), and others. The capital accumulation constraint is
given by
Kt  1   Kt1  It,
where Kt is the current period capital stock,
It  I t
Gross  I t
Net  I t
Replacement, and hence
I t
Net  It  Kt1.
Denoting output by Yt and the optimal level of capital by
K*t, the flexible accelerator (Koyck) model assumes that
each period a proportion  of the gap Kt  K*t between the
actual and optimal level of capital is closed. The model
further assumes that K*t  Yt and net investment is hence
given by It
Net  (K*t  Kt1)  Yt  Kt1, implying
that the actual level of capital may be expressed as Kt 
Yt 	 (1  ) Kt1. Substituting this expression into the
equations for Kt1, Kt2, . . . , one obtains
Kt  
Yt  1  Yt1  1  
2Yt2
 1  3Yt3  . . . ,
(1)
which yields the corresponding net investment equation in
first differences:
It
Net  Kt  Kt1  Kt  
Yt  1  Yt1
 1  2Yt2  1  
3Yt3  . . . .
We can substitute back into the gross investment relation-
ship to obtain
It  Kt  1   Kt1  Yt     Kt1. (2)
Although it is possible to proceed further in rearranging
equation (2), the resulting specification tends to suffer from
22 This is a rather strict test because even in western empirical applica-
tions the model has often encountered problems of convergence or
generated counterintuitive parameter values (Bond & Meghir, 1994).
However, the model represents an appealing alternative to empirical
specifications relying on Tobin’s Q because financial markets are not yet
efficient, and adequate data for constructing the values of Q hence do not
exist in the transition economies.
TABLE 3.—CONTINUED
Inv./Capital Inv./Prod. Inv./Lab. Profit Labor Investm. Prod. Capital
1998/Q1 0.058 0.065 16.7 13111 453 10365 166251 306743
(0.421) (0.214) (49.8) (110878) (1092) (71311) (786826) (1158120)
[1872] [2205] [2205] [2205] [2205] [2205] [2205] [1872]
1998/Q2 0.058 0.073 21.9 6623 455 14796 166796 395351
(0.245) (0.189) (67.0) (52878) (1092) (104167) (785015) (3076007)
[2167] [2171] [2171] [2171] [2171] [2171] [2171] [2167]
1998/Q3 0.060 0.083 22.2 3936 451 14866 153501 399330
(0.279) (0.248) (80.9) (68175) (1082) (104122) (693473) (3100550)
[2171] [2173] [2173] [2173] [2173] [2173] [2173] [2171]
1998/Q4 0.088 0.120 37.7 2019 452 27536 173375 412321
(0.382) (0.604) (154.8) (75062) (1079) (241179) (766146) (3174196)
[2132] [2132] [2132] [2132] [2132] [2132] [2132] [2132]
Total 0.075 0.126 16.8 3326 384 8046 78877 370325
(0.919) (1.124) (67.2) (46659) (1160) (66978) (383870) (1832438)
[61600] [83539] [83185] [68471] [83185] [83539] [83539] [61601]
Standard deviations in parentheses and number of quarterly observations in brackets. Investment/labor, profit, investment, production, and capital are in thousands of Crowns.
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autocorrelated error terms.23 We hence use equations (1) and
(2). Because this specification requires the adjustment pro-
cess to be a distributed lag (and hence the coefficients to
decline according to a geometric pattern), we follow the
literature and relax this restriction. In particular, we build on
equations (1) and (2) by experimenting with specific num-
bers of lagged terms of output without imposing restrictions
on their coefficients:
It  k  biYti  cKt1  et i  0, 1, 2, . . . , m,
(3)
where k is a constant, e is the error term, and equation (3)
may also be viewed as a special case of Jorgenson’s rational
lag function.
In a neoclassical model, we arrive at equation such as (3)
by assuming that the firm maximizes a profit function, t 
ptYt  wtLt  ctKt, subject to a neoclassical production
function Yt  f(Kt, Lt), where capital Kt and labor Lt are
substitutable, p is the output price, w is the wage, and c is
the user cost of capital. The maximization results in the
standard first-order conditions equating the marginal prod-
uct of labor to the wage and the marginal product of capital
to its user cost. This approach requires one to specify the
production function and define the user cost of capital.
Depending on the production function, a general form of the
estimating investment equation is of the form
It  k  bi p/ctiYti  di p/ctiYti1
 Kt1  et i  0, 1, 2, . . . m.
If one considers a one-period investment ordering (invest-
ment requiring one period to be fully installed) in the
context of a Cobb-Douglas production function Y 
KL1, one obtains  (Yt/Kt)  ct/pt and K*t   ( p/c)tYt.
The net investment is then given by
It
net  K*t  p/ctYt  Yt1
 p/ctYt  p/ctYt1,
and gross investment is given by an equation that is of the
same form as equation (3):
It  gi  p/ctiYti  Kt1  et,
i  0, 1, 2, . . . m,
(3)
23 Note that, because equation (2) holds also for t  1, it follows that
It1  Kt1  1   Kt2  Yt1     Kt2
and, by multiplying each side by (1  ) and subtracting the resulting
equation from (2), one obtains
It  I  It1  Yt  1  Yt1
	    Kt1  1     Kt2.
This equation may in turn be rewritten as
It  1  It1  Yt  1  Yt1    It1,
because It  Kt  (1  ) Kt1 implies that It1  Kt1 
(1  ) Kt2. Rearranging and collecting the It1 terms yields
It  Yt  1  Yt1  1  It1.
The advantage of this resulting investment equation is that it does not
require data on capital stock. However, because it contains lagged
dependent variable and the error process tends to be correlated, the
inconsistency problem in OLS arises.





















1992 0.021 0.144 0.015  0.031   0.079 0.192 0.104   0.022
(0.034) (0.337) (0.039)  (0.120)   (0.135) (0.245) (0.322)   (0.078)
[619] [28] [1704] [0] [524] [0] [0] [20] [14] [18] [0] [0] [2927]
1993 0.034 0.083 0.012 0.252 0.024 0.166 0.032 0.185 0.291 0.022 0.665 0.029 0.110
(0.262) (0.483) (0.028) (2.842) (0.063) (1.527) (0.086) (0.739) (1.263) (0.071) (2.583) (0.060) (1.576)
[2516] [331] [2395] [2906] [984] [508] [90] [141] [358] [123] [53] [77] [10482]
1994 0.019 0.055 0.009 0.150 0.024 0.089 0.033 0.049 0.167 0.025 0.108 0.076 0.087
(0.054) (0.201) (0.030) (1.450) (0.147) (0.431) (0.106) (0.077) (0.685) (0.066) (0.546) (0.265) (0.938)
[3225] [870] [1186] [5758] [1026] [695] [126] [243] [881] [272] [99] [194] [14575]
1995 0.021 0.062 0.009 0.085 0.018 0.050 0.043 0.040 0.168 0.023 0.112 0.112 0.053
(0.067) (0.378) (0.024) (0.474) (0.033) (0.096) (0.144) (0.089) (0.832) (0.088) (0.295) (0.229) (0.347)
[2859] [836] [479] [2539] [590] [138] [100] [190] [432] [231] [91] [82] [8567]
1996 0.015 0.053 0.010 0.124 0.021 0.055 0.035 0.044 0.165 0.021 0.046 0.112 0.071
(0.029) (0.325) (0.030) (1.947) (0.082) (0.155) (0.063) (0.170) (1.012) (0.076) (0.119) (0.582) (1.111)
[416] [1575] [295] [2593] [534] [123] [80] [420] [649] [1841] [84] [88] [8698]
1997 0.033 0.042 0.024 0.080 0.031 0.155 0.038 0.049 0.138 0.039 0.093 0.111 0.063
(0.081) (0.108) (0.068) (0.271) (0.066) (0.606) (0.061) (0.086) (0.324) (0.172) (0.213) (0.398) (0.220)
[303] [1993] [165] [2314] [446] [139] [73] [481] [699] [1226] [84] [86] [8009]
1998 0.038 0.042 0.031 0.083 0.031 0.123 0.056 0.065 0.141 0.039 0.092 0.054 0.066
(0.091) (0.107) (0.103) (0.442) (0.061) (0.604) (0.081) (0.149) (0.633) (0.141) (0.173) (0.128) (0.336)
[267] [2262] [118] [2243] [424] [190] [59] [489] [886] [1200] [84] [120] [8342]
Total 0.024 0.050 0.013 0.136 0.025 0.114 0.038 0.061 0.167 0.031 0.152 0.080 0.075
(1.140) (0.239) (0.036) (1.594) (0.096) (0.896) (0.098) (0.234) (0.779) (0.125) (0.908) (0.313) (0.919)
[10205] [7895] [6342] [18353] [4528] [1793] [528] [1984] [3919] [4911] [495] [647] [61600]
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where gi  1 (i  0, 1, 2, . . . m), if no investment
orders were canceled.
The neoclassical and accelerator models embedded in
equations (3) and (3) are usually operationalized by relat-











where the interpretation of ’s depends on whether the
underlying theory refers to the neoclassical or accelerator
models and m is the number of lags. In our empirical work,
we also control for the ratio of output price to user cost of
capital ratio by including firm-specific fixed effects and time
dummy variables and by estimating the equation separately
for the different categories of firms.
Equation (4) reflects the firm’s demand for investment,
and it implicitly assumes that the supply of investment
funds is perfectly elastic. In accounting for the possibility
that the firm faces transaction costs or restrictions in obtain-
ing external financing, the usual approach in the investment
literature is to augment this type of equation by one or more
cash flow variables such as profit. Because Czech firms
were required to pay for internally financed investment from
retained profits and our data set contains information on
profit for most firms in most of the time periods, we
examine the link of investment to this variable. In the
studies of advanced market economies, a positive coeffi-
cient on profit (cash flow) is usually interpreted as an
indication that firms are credit rationed because, in a perfect
capital market, the firm and lender would be indifferent
between internal and external financing and the coefficient
on profit would hence be zero.
We note that, in the transition context, the inclusion of the
profit variable as a regressor allows one also to test the soft
budget constraint hypothesis. In particular, because firms
have used bank credit extensively as their principal and
almost exclusive form of external financing, a zero coeffi-
cient on profit signals that firms have access to bank credit
for investment irrespective of their profitability, which as we
saw earlier ranges from highly positive to highly negative.
In the presence of high investment rates and rapid accumu-
lation of nonperforming enterprise loans by the banks, this
nondiscriminatory supply of bank funds to firms signals the
presence of a soft budget constraint for the poorly perform-
ing firms. We also formulate a stronger version of the soft
budget constraint hypothesis, namely that the coefficient on
profit is negative. This strong version reflects the case
wherein poorly performing firms get a better access to bank
loans and invest more, ceteris paribus, than profitable
firms.25
During some quarters we are missing either profit, capi-
tal, or investment data for some of the firms and, because
our final specification requires at least five quarters of
24 Note that the usual assumption on the form of heteroskedasticity of et
leads to scaling with the reciprocal of capital. We therefore use t to denote
the transformed residuals.
25 For another possible manifestation of the soft budget constraint,
namely in the form of higher wages, see Prasnikar and Svejnar (1998).
The particular form of the soft budget constraint hence depends on
institutional environments.





















1992 17.1 25.6 10.9 10.2 3.7 8.2 2.9 50.6 22.9 14.3 21.1 9.9 12.9
(68.0) (120.3) (34.8) (74.6) (12.0) (30.9) (7.8) (156.3) (88.2) (38.5) (69.3) (20.7) (62.7)
[2490] [292] [2393] [2079] [959] [393] [78] [124] [261] [117] [34] [64] [9284]
1993 17.4 27.2 9.9 8.8 4.2 7.4 18.8 50.5 29.9 13.3 35.7 10.7 12.8
(47.6) (100.5) (27.4) (32.4) (11.1) (16.9) (69.6) (142.8) (105.7) (41.0) (84.5) (22.4) (46.5)
[2516] [331] [2395] [2906] [984] [508] [90] [141] [358] [123] [53] [74] [10479]
1994 17.4 31.1 7.0 12.7 4.7 13.3 13.5 38.8 38.2 15.7 10.5 19.4 16.0
(48.6) (190.1) (25.8) (69.5) (11.3) (47.6) (66.5) (59.7) (119.7) (34.2) (25.4) (49.5) (76.5)
[3225] [870] [1186] [5758] [1026] [695] [126] [243] [881] [272] [99] [186] [14567]
1995 18.6 27.4 8.1 9.8 5.8 7.3 21 44.2 39.4 17.3 7.5 46.2 17.0
(41.2) (93.4) (21.0) (33.4) (12.0) (21.2) (80.4) (77.6) (86.7) (66.6) (18.7) (86.4) (51.6)
[2859] [836] [479] [2539] [590] [138] [100] [190] [432] [231] [91] [82] [8567]
1996 16.3 21.0 14.2 11.5 5.4 8.6 31.5 50.8 37.0 21.6 4.2 32.8 19.4
(44.0) (64.7) (89.9) (52.4) (12.2) (21.5) (105.8) (88.2) (94.1) (53.2) (7.0) (75.9) (62.1)
[416] [1575] [295] [2593] [534] [123] [80] [420] [649] [1841] [84] [88] [8698]
1997 20.0 22.0 14.7 12.5 5.3 12.6 15.6 43.2 32.7 17.5 8.3 23.0 16.9
(71.9) (75.0) (63.1) (52.7) (14.3) (51.4) (32.1) (81.8) (106.8) (34.6) (22.0) (56.9) (63.5)
[392] [2817] [280] [10355] [927] [3147] [81] [605] [2459] [1395] [200] [251] [22909]
1998 26.3 25.4 10.7 10.9 5.9 9.4 13.9 54.8 40.6 36.3 9.9 19.8 24.5
(63.3) (123.9) (19.4) (39.3) (13.2) (17.0) (23.7) (117.0) (87.8) (139) (24.4) (31.8) (96.6)
[272] [2370] [124] [2321] [431] [208] [61] [495] [934] [1247] [87] [131] [8681]
Total 17.9 24.4 10.0 11.5 4.8 11.5 16.8 47.7 35.1 23.2 11.1 22.9 16.8
(52.6) (107.5) (35.9) (54.5) (12.3) (45.1) (65.8) (99.6) (102.7) (79.4) (35.6) (54.9) (67.2)
[12170] [9091] [7152] [28551] [5451] [5212] [616] [2218] [5974] [5226] [648] [876] [83185]
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consecutive presence in the data, the set of firms on which
we run the investment equation is hence somewhat smaller
than the original one. To control for possible selection bias
stemming from this switch to a smaller data set, we first run
a Heckman-type probit equation, predicting the probability
of the firm being included in the sample on the basis of
output, profit, industry dummy variables, and firm type
variables. The resulting inverse Mills ratio is included as an
explanatory variable in the investment equation:
Ii,t
Ki,t1
   
k1
m k i,tkKi,t1  k Yi,tkKi,t1  Mi,t
 TXi,t  i,t,
(5)
where  denotes gross profit, M the inverse Mills ratio from
the probit estimation, and X a set of quarterly (and in the
case of longer panels also annual) dummy variables. Natu-
rally, ’s and ’s are the parameters of our main interest,
with vector  and  being other parameters to be estimated.
We have run pretests with varying numbers of lags. Because
we have quarterly data, we have focused on models with the
number of lags equal to or greater than four. The results for
four or more lags are similar, and we hence report findings
based on m  4.26 To control for firm-specific heterogene-
ity, we estimate equation (5) using a fixed-effects (mean
deviation or within group) specification. As is customary in
the literature, we assume that the lagged values of the
regressors are exogenous.
As mentioned earlier, we also estimate an investment
equation that corresponds to a structural model of dynamic
optimization by firms in the presence of adjustment costs:
Ii,t
Ki,t





 3Yi,t1  wi,t1Li,t1Ki,t1   TXi,t  i,t,
(6)
where w denotes the wage, L is employment, and ’s are
parameters. Because models such as the one in equation (6)
have a lagged dependent variable as a regressor and need a
substantial time dimension for convergence (Bond and
Meghir, 1994), we estimate equation (6) on the deviations
from the mean using the whole panel. We use the first and
second powers of the deviations from the mean of the
twice-lagged labor-capital ratio, the wage interacted with
the labor-capital ratio, the output per worker minus the wage
interacted with the labor-capital ratio, and the output-capital
ratio as instruments for the right-side variables.27
26 We have also estimated equations with a four-quarter difference
specification and found the results to be similar to those obtained with four
quarterly lags. However, the four-quarter difference specification by
construction shortens our panel by an additional four periods and is more
demanding on the completeness of the firm presence in the time dimen-
sion.
27 The Euler equation models require a large time dimension to converge
to consistent estimates even if the number of firms is large because, in the
presence of aggregate shocks, the error term contains a prediction error
that averages to zero over time but not over firms. This need for a long
timespan is a major problem in empirical studies of investment because
there are usually fewer than twenty time observations. We have only
seven-year data, and the high seasonality of quarterly observations effec-
tively wipes out the advantage of longer time dimension of the panel.
(Lı́zal (1999b) examines the effects of such seasonality in a simpler setup





















1992 0.176 0.272 0.144 0.124 0.080 0.077 0.029 1.354 0.236 0.403 0.651 0.091 0.165
(1.004) (1.935) (0.744) (1.582) (0.308) (0.309) (0.072) (9.548) (0.791) (2.532) (3.200) (0.315) (1.572)
[2490] [292] [2393] [2079] [959] [393] [78] [124] [261] [117] [34] [64] [9284]
1993 0.139 0.158 0.221 0.097 0.079 0.074 0.144 0.260 0.289 0.075 0.350 0.184 0.145
(0.404) (0.420) (2.747) (0.437) (0.255) (0.205) (0.419) (0.694) (1.346) (0.219) (0.908) (0.472) (1.381)
[2516] [331] [2395] [2906] [984] [508] [90] [141] [358] [123] [53] [81] [10486]
1994 0.132 0.223 0.055 0.127 0.075 0.153 0.25 0.171 0.275 0.103 0.085 0.15 0.136
(0.985) (1.466) (0.170) (1.397) (0.318) (0.788) (2.163) (0.322) (1.179) (0.245) (0.201) (0.395) (1.133)
[3225] [870] [1186] [5758] [1026] [695] [126] [243] [881] [272] [99] [206] [14587]
1995 0.196 0.177 0.072 0.086 0.082 0.057 0.211 0.168 0.242 0.094 0.048 0.278 0.143
(2.606) (0.524) (0.298) (0.473) (0.185) (0.178) (1.142) (0.333) (0.890) (0.291) (0.081) (0.640) (1.560)
[2859] [836] [479] [2539] [590] [138] [100] [190] [432] [231] [91] [82] [8567]
1996 0.107 0.143 0.233 0.061 0.066 0.064 0.164 0.151 0.165 0.128 0.033 0.103 0.112
(0.300) (1.075) (2.386) (0.212) (0.147) (0.144) (0.672) (0.279) (0.422) (0.420) (0.063) (0.167) (0.694)
[416] [1575] [295] [2593] [534] [123] [80] [420] [649] [1841] [84] [88] [8698]
1997 0.096 0.100 0.506 0.085 0.063 0.129 0.06 0.139 0.162 0.100 0.068 0.192 0.109
(0.254) (0.433) (3.132) (0.847) (0.367) (1.226) (0.123) (0.593) (0.662) (0.374) (0.204) (0.915) (0.872)
[392] [2817] [282] [10501] [937] [3290] [81] [605] [2480] [1395] [204] [252] [23236]
1998 0.133 0.082 0.053 0.047 0.053 0.083 0.048 0.134 0.139 0.108 0.040 0.093 0.085
(0.391) (0.240) (0.101) (0.131) (0.108) (0.419) (0.079) (0.304) (0.273) (0.747) (0.091) (0.291) (0.355)
[272] [2370] [124] [2321] [431] [208] [61] [495] [934] [1247] [87] [131] [8681]
Total 0.156 0.129 0.166 0.092 0.073 0.118 0.144 0.222 0.192 0.118 0.113 0.159 0.126
(1.449) (0.795) (1.830) (0.938) (0.278) (1.012) (1.12) (2.306) (0.782) (0.62) (0.793) (0.591) (1.124)
[12170] [9091] [7154] [28697] [5461] [5355] [616] [2218] [5995] [5226] [652] [904] [83539]
Standard errors in parentheses, and number of observations in brackets.
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Equation (6) is appealing because it provides evidence on
the consistency of enterprise behavior during the transition
with a model of profit maximization in the presence of cost
of adjustment. As mentioned earlier, this is valuable because
a key turning point in the transition occurs when the behav-
ior of firms starts approximating that of a firm in a market
economy. We use the investment setting to provide micro-
econometric evidence on this issue. In particular, omitting
for simplicity the firm subscript i, equation (6) may be
derived from the maximization of the present discounted
value of firm’s expected profits Vt as follows:28









 j  0,
(8)
 1 j  0,
t  Kt, Lt, It  ptYKt, Lt, It  wtLt  pt
IIt,
(9)




2  ItKt  b
2
Kt, a, b  0, (10)
where the term E[  t] denotes the expectation conditional
on all information available at the time t,
t is the expected profit at time t,
t	j is the discount factor between period t and t 	 j
(assuming that payments are made at the beginning of
each period),
r is the discount rate,
p is output price,
F(  ,  ) is a strictly concave (unobservable) frontier
production function,
G(  ,  ) is a strictly convex (unobservable) cost of
capital adjustment function,
Y(  ,  ,  )  F(  ,  )  G(  ,  ) is the firm’s
observable production, and
a and b are parameters of the cost of the capital adjust-
ment function.29
The term pt
IIt is used instead of the usual “capital rental” on
the assumption that investment is paid for at the time of
purchase.
In this setting, the firm’s optimal investment problem can
be restated as a dynamic programming problem with a
single-state variable Kt and single control variable It:30
VtKt1  max
KtItLt
Kt, It, Lt  E
t	1Vt	1Ktt.
(11)
Assuming that the production function F(  ,  ) is homo-
geneous of degree 1 in labor and capital and that the firm
has rational expectations, one can differentiate equation (11)
with respect to the choice variables Kt, Lt, and It to obtain
equation (6) after algebraic manipulations.31for depreciation). As could be expected in this situation, when we perform
the estimation separately for the major ownership-legal status groups, the
estimates generate high standard errors and unreasonable mean values of
parameters. The need for a larger cross-sectional dimension in the pres-
ence of a limited number of time observations has led us to estimate the
Euler equation jointly on all observations, allowing the ownership-legal
status effects to be captured as different intercepts in the fixed effect.
28 See also Mátyás and Severstre (1992) or Bond and Meghir (1994) for
related derivations.
29 In the classical setup, the production function F(  ,  ) and the
adjustment cost function G(  ,  ) are assumed to be additively separable.
30 We assume that capital can be changed only through investment and
the investment decision is made at the beginning of each period.
31 In the present derivation, we assume that the labor input may be
adjusted costlessly. This assumption may be relaxed with no influence on























k 0.010*** 0.065*** 0.008*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.027*** 0.572*** 0.016** 0.128*** 0.026*** 0.050*** 0.003 0.040***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.018) (0.007) (0.024) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008)
k 0.019*** 0.063*** 0.007 0.002 0.051*** 0.052*** 0.808*** 0.060 0.104 0.062** 0.001 0.015 0.127***
(0.003) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.015) (0.127) (0.114) (0.088) (0.028) (0.014) (0.013) (0.021)
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.076 0.000 0.004 0.948 0.003 0.000
Adj. R2 0.118 0.291 0.166 0.097 0.180 0.373 0.661 0.273 0.252 0.079 0.170 0.290 0.178
N/NF 42483/3805 7884/865 5751/699 3797/501 10899/1254 3635/255 971/159 373/35 1728/149 2372/265 4410/504 305/34 358/46
Standard errors in parentheses.
Values for 1992 are used for lagged values of regressors only.
***  significant at 1% level
**  significant at 5% level
*  significant at 10% level
N  number of quarterly observations
NF  number of firms
P-value  p-value of the Hausman test of equality of fixed-effect and random-effect estimates.
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IV. Empirical Estimates
In table 5, we present our overall estimates of equation
(5), which allow us to capture the importance of the
neoclassical-accelerator and the internal funds-soft budget
constraint models. The estimates are based on 1992–1998
quarterly data for the twelve principal categories of firms,
and the coefficients give the total effects of the four lagged
output and profit variables.32
As may be seen from table 5, the sum of the coefficients
on output is positive and statistically significant for all
categories of firms except for the mixed/limited-liability
group (34 firms), where the coefficient is 0.003 and
statistically insignificant. As might be expected from these
individual results, the overall regression using pooled data
from all firms generates a positive and statistically signifi-
cant coefficient on output as well. The sum of coefficients
on profit is also positive in the overall regression based on
pooled observations from all firms, but among the individ-
ual categories of firms it is positive and significant in only
five of the twelve categories. All the remaining coefficient
estimates are statistically insignificant, except for the coef-
ficient on private/individual firms, which is negative and
significant.
The estimates in table 5 hence indicate that the
neoclassical-accelerator model, reflecting firm behavior that
is consistent with profit maximization, receives a fairly
uniform support from virtually all categories of firms. The
credit-rationing hypothesis is supported by data from the
three categories of mostly smaller firms (private/limited-
liability companies, cooperatives, and foreign/limited-
liability firms) and also from the category of state-owned/
joint-stock firms. The finding that investment in smaller
firms varies positively with firm’s profit could be expected
in an underdeveloped financial market in which smaller
firms do not have easy access to bank capital and are
unlikely to benefit from a soft budget constraint because
they are not former state-owned firms. The positive coeffi-
cient on profit in the category of state-owned/joint-stock
firms points to the absence of a soft budget constraint in
these firms, but a more complex picture emerges as we
address this issue with more-disaggregated data below. All
except one of the remaining categories contain primarily
larger firms and generate insignificant coefficients on prof-
it—a finding that is consistent with a lack of credit rationing
and the presence of a soft budget constraint. Following on
our earlier discussion, the soft budget constraint is consis-
tent with these findings if some firms encounter difficulties
selling their output at a profit but receive bank loans even if
they produce at a loss. If profitable firms in the same
categories also have access to bank credit, one may find a
positive coefficient on output (the firms produce and invest)
and an insignificant coefficient on profit (banks provide
investment funds irrespective of profitability). Finally, the
negative profit coefficient in private/individual firms, al-
though consistent with the strong soft budget constraint
hypothesis, most likely stems from the fact that many of
these firms are newly created entities whose investment
occurs in the start-up stage in their life cycle when their
profit is low or negative. We next examine these issues in
more detail.
Our strategy is to generate first separate estimates for
larger and smaller firms to see if investment behavior varies
with size across the various categories of firms. We divide
the firms into two groups: those with one hundred or more
workers and those with fewer than one hundred workers.
This division also allows us to take into account the fact that
our data do not cover firms with fewer than one hundred
workers in 1995, 1996, and, to some extent, in 1998. In
particular, by generating estimates for firms with one hun-
dred and more workers in all years, we can assess the impact
of the aforementioned change in statistical coverage.
As may be seen from the top panel of table 6, the
estimates of equation (5) for firms with one hundred and
more workers are very similar to those obtained for all firms
in table 5.33 The corresponding coefficients have identical
signs in all cases except for the profit coefficient in privately
owned/individual firms, wherein firms with one hundred
and more workers display a statistically insignificant coef-
ficient, as compared to the negative coefficient found in the
combined group of large and small firms. As might be
expected, the negative and statistically significant coeffi-
cient is found in the smaller, privately owned/individual
firms in the lower panel of table 6. Because these small
firms tend to be more recent startups than their larger
counterparts, the findings in table 6 suggest that it is the
small (rather than both small and large) privately owned/
individual firms that are observed during the startup stage of
their life cycle when they invest heavily and their profit is
low or negative. Interestingly, although both small and large
cooperatives appear to be credit rationed, private and for-
eign limited-liability companies display credit rationing
among only the larger firms. With these caveats in mind, we
can conclude that the estimates based on all data are quite
similar to those for larger firms.
Because investment behavior is likely to have undergone
changes as the firms proceeded through the transition pro-
cess, we have also estimated equation (5) separately for
each year.34 As may be seen from table 7, the separate
annual estimates for 1993–1998 show considerable varia-
the core of our derivation. See, for example, Estrin and Svejnar (1993) for
the derivation and estimation of a model with adjustment costs of labor.
32 The 1992 data are used for lagged values of regressors. The underly-
ing individual coefficients may be obtained from the authors upon request.
33 In this estimation, we have left out the three categories of firms that
have too few observations when divided into the two size groups:
state-owned/limited-liability enterprises, mixed/limited-liability compa-
nies, and other firms.
34 As in tables 5 and 6, in table 7 we report the total effects of output and
profit. The individual coefficients for each of the lagged values of output
and profit may be obtained from the authors upon request.
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tion in investment behavior over time.35 Moreover, in ex-
amining the raw data, we have detected significant move-
ments of firms across categories during certain years. As we
show presently, it is essential to use this information in
evaluating changes in the estimated coefficients over time.
The overall regression (based on observations from all
firms) in table 7 generates a positive coefficient on total
output in all six years, whereas the effect of profit is
negative in 1993 and 1996, statistically insignificant in
1994, and positive in 1995, 1997, and 1998. In the aggre-
gate, production hence drove investment in each year, while
profitability was negatively related or unrelated to invest-
ment in the early 1990s, and primarily positively related in
the second half of the 1990s. In examining the coefficients
in the individual categories of firms, one finds in table 7 (as
in table 5) that there are more positive (statistically signif-
icant) coefficients on output than on profit. The data are also
increasingly supportive of the neoclassical-accelerator
model as the transition proceeds, in that the number of
categories of firms with positive coefficients on output
increases (almost but not quite monotonically) from three in
1993 to eight in 1998. In contrast, the number of categories
of firms with a positive coefficient on profit varies between
one and four and, although it increases over time, the pattern
is not particularly strong. Hence, most coefficient estimates
on profit are consistent with the soft budget constraint.
The support of the neoclassical-accelerator model also
becomes evident when one notes that the categories of firms
whose behavior is consistent with this model are the most
numerous ones and increasingly so over time. Hence, al-
though slightly more than 50% of firms belonged to the
categories that conformed to this model in 1993 and 1994,
by 1998 the proportion rose to almost 100%. The categories
of firms whose coefficient estimates are consistent with the
credit-rationing model account for about one-third of firms
in each of the six years, and two-thirds of firms therefore
have estimates that are consistent with the soft budget
constraint hypothesis.
In examining the coefficients of individual categories of
firms in table 7, we take into account year-to-year move-
ments of ten or more firms across the ownership/legal status
categories. There was no such movement between 1992 and
1993, and the 1993 estimates reflect the categorization of
firms just before the first wave of large-scale privatization.36
A particularly interesting finding for 1993 is that the esti-
mated coefficients on profit for state-owned/joint-stock
companies and state-owned/state enterprises are negative.
This suggests that, in 1992–1993, these two largest groups
35 In all sets of regressions, the 1992 data are used as lagged values of
1993 regressors.
36 Czech mass privatization proceeded in several stages. Between 1990
and 1991, various properties valued between $2.5 billion and $4.2 billion
were restituted to previous owners. Between 1991 and 1993, small firms
were sold for about $1 billion in the so-called small-scale privatization
program. The most important method by which most medium and large
state-owned enterprises were privatized was the large-scale privatization
program, which accounted for about $30 billion in asset value. To handle
the large number of firms, the large-scale privatization program was
divided into two waves, with the first wave occurring between 1992 and
1993 and the second wave between 1993 and 1995. The large-scale
privatization program employed a variety of privatization methods, in-
cluding direct sales and transfer of shares to the population at large.
TABLE 6.—1992–1993 FIXED-EFFECT ESTIMATES OF INVESTMENT EQUATION (5) BY SIZE AND TYPE OF THE FIRM


















k 0.007*** 0.072*** 0.009*** 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.027*** 0.060*** 0.132*** 0.027*** 0.051***
(0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.011) (0.025) (0.005) (0.002)
k 0.039*** 0.057*** 0.013 0.016 0.081*** 0.057*** 0.041 0.094 0.075** 0.032
(0.003) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016) (0.011) (0.020) (0.034) (0.092) (0.037) (0.025)
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.026 0.008 0.000 0.015 0.991
Adj. R2 0.133 0.301 0.177 0.109 0.183 0.211 0.251 0.254 0.079 0.177
N/NF 36837/2974 7557/826 5479/671 3036/395 8497/842 2905/174 501/63 1651/140 2018/214 4237/486


















k 0.046*** 0.003 0.022* 0.011 0.006** 0.024** 0.620*** 0.048 0.017 0.033
(0.003) (0.010) (0.012) (0.008) (0.003) (0.010) (0.024) (0.055) (0.011) (0.039)
k 0.075*** 0.011 0.072 0.002 0.005 0.096** 1.014*** 0.187 0.015 0.038
(0.019) (0.029) (0.108) (0.032) (0.014) (0.044) (0.218) (0.242) (0.041) (0.085)
P-value 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.218 0.027 0.158 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.902
Adj. R2 0.024 0.371 0.006 0.088 0.156 0.654 0.756 0.787 0.177 0.035
N/NF 5646/1412 327/89 272/89 761/182 2402/622 730/147 470/116 77/18 354/85 173/59
Standard errors in parentheses.
Values for 1992 are used for lagged values of regressors only.
***  significant at 1% level
**  significant at 5% level
*  significant at 10% level
N  number of quarterly observations
NF  number of firms
P-value  p-value of the Hausman test of equality of fixed-effect and random-effect estimates.
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k 0.095*** 0.113*** 0.028 0.040** 0.001 0.043 0.712*** 0.706 0.046* 0.199
(0.005) (0.010) (0.022) (0.015) (0.006) (0.029) (0.029) (0.875) (0.025) (0.132)
k 0.229*** 0.114* 0.163 0.150*** 0.136*** 0.153** 1.138** 0.239 0.043 0.432
(0.030) (0.062) (0.404) (0.042) (0.041) (0.060) (0.475) (2.870) (0.083) (0.291)
P-value 0.000 0.006 0.396 0.000 0.000 0.112 0.000 0.017 0.080 0.598
Adj. R2 0.205 0.546 0.212 0.283 0.429 0.313 0.854 0.053 0.379 0.047



















k 0.016*** 0.000 0.025 0.000 0.016** 0.036*** 0.310*** 0.018 0.228*** 0.083
(0.002) (0.008) (0.023) (0.005) (0.007) (0.011) (0.040) (0.121) (0.030) (0.056)
k 0.003 0.001 0.048 0.013 0.057** 0.021 0.351*** 0.993** 0.114 0.379**
(0.013) (0.020) (0.242) (0.025) (0.028) (0.054) (0.092) (0.394) (0.080) (0.165)
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.996 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.164
Adj. R2 0.242 0.314 0.515 0.007 0.197 0.758 0.291 0.500 0.345 0.251



















k 0.074*** 0.064*** 0.038* 0.011** 0.090*** 0.003 0.070 0.240*** 0.078 0.023
(0.006) (0.009) (0.019) (0.005) (0.009) (0.021) (0.044) (0.070) (0.211) (0.018)
k 0.065*** 0.084** 0.028 0.019 0.055** 0.159* 0.020 0.268 0.436 1.164**
(0.015) (0.042) (0.078) (0.036) (0.023) (0.086) (0.113) (0.216) (0.610) (0.463)
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.084 0.607 0.044 0.987 0.004
Adj. R2 0.101 0.336 0.247 0.650 0.151 0.282 0.241 0.638 0.004 0.072



















k 0.023*** 0.059** 0.061*** 0.104*** 0.052*** 0.024 0.225** 0.048 0.039** 0.058***
(0.004) (0.029) (0.004) (0.016) (0.012) (0.027) (0.091) (0.029) (0.018) (0.003)
k 0.070* 0.190** 0.971*** 0.459*** 0.011 0.032 0.688** 0.033 0.045 0.267***
(0.036) (0.093) (0.056) (0.131) (0.084) (0.248) (0.320) (0.230) (0.056) (0.060)
P-value 0.000 0.059 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.704 0.099 0.206 0.208 0.000
Adj. R2 0.094 0.284 0.566 0.490 0.098 0.107 0.485 0.115 0.415 0.725



















k 0.014*** 0.051** 0.105*** 0.024 0.017*** 0.020 0.029 0.037 0.026*** 0.011
(0.002) (0.020) (0.008) (0.021) (0.003) (0.012) (0.057) (0.034) (0.007) (0.008)
k 0.050*** 0.063 0.100** 0.113 0.050** 0.249*** 0.261 0.351** 0.330*** 0.025
(0.011) (0.060) (0.043) (0.082) (0.022) (0.086) (0.283) (0.141) (0.063) (0.072)
P-value 0.000 0.216 0.000 1.000 0.039 0.000 0.009 0.331 0.000 0.130
Adj. R2 0.217 0.178 0.291 0.075 0.168 0.455 0.685 0.264 0.413 0.073



















k 0.013*** 0.051 0.014*** 0.630*** 0.013*** 0.042*** 0.029* 0.620*** 0.013*** 0.067***
(0.001) (0.042) (0.003) (0.131) (0.004) (0.012) (0.016) (0.061) (0.004) (0.005)
k 0.027*** 0.050 0.118*** 0.694* 0.005 0.136* 0.017 0.361 0.020 0.056***
(0.007) (0.243) (0.037) (0.363) (0.034) (0.077) (0.066) (0.220) (0.055) (0.020)
P-value 0.000 0.636 0.000 0.006 0.019 0.579 0.448 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adj. R2 0.169 0.141 0.194 0.190 0.066 0.380 0.407 0.399 0.541 0.331
N/NF 6651/1799 242/64 1746/475 97/28 1775/484 400/103 113/35 455/119 629/172 1015/271
Standard errors in parentheses.
Values for 1992 are used for lagged values of regressors only.
***  significant at 1% level
**  significant at 5% level
*  significant at 10% level
N  number of quarterly observations
NF  number of firms
P-value  p-value of the Hausman test of equality of fixed-effect and random-effect estimates.
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS366
of firms (accounting for more than 50% of all industrial
firms at the time) were operating under a strong version of
the soft budget constraint in that investment was negatively
related to profit.37 The negative coefficient on profit changes
to zero for these two categories of firms in 1994 and actually
turns positive for state/joint ventures in 1995, before be-
coming again negative for both sets of firms in 1996.38 This
suggests that the nature of the credit constraint of the
state-owned firms changed over time, showing little sign of
being restrictive and some sign of being quite soft in at least
two years.
In interpreting changes in the estimated coefficients over
time, one must take into account the fact that, between 1993
and 1994, 68 firms moved out of the state-owned/joint-stock
category of firms, with forty firms going to the private/joint-
stock and 28 to the mixed/joint-stock category. Moreover,
140 firms moved from the category of state-owned/state
enterprises to other categories that we cannot identify.39
Overall, the number of firms in the private/joint-stock and
mixed/joint-stock categories virtually doubled in 1994, pri-
marily due to the influx of former state-owned firms. The
fact that the estimated coefficient on profit for the mixed/
joint-stock firms turns from being insignificant in 1993 to
negative in 1994 hence suggest that the incoming firms were
those that operated under the strong soft budget constraint
and continued to do so a year later under mixed ownership.
Hence, although some of the changes in coefficient esti-
mates could signal moderation of state-owned banks in
providing credit to unprofitable firms, some were brought
about by the switch of firms across ownership/legal status
categories.40 In addition, it should be noted that the number
of private/limited-liability companies almost doubled be-
tween 1993 and 1994, and the firms also registered a
negative coefficient on profit in 1994. Some of the new
firms may be the former state-owned/state enterprises oper-
ating under the strong version of the soft budget constraint,
whereas others are newly created firms that invest heavily
during the start-up period when profits are low or negative.
Finally, the number of foreign/joint-stock companies in-
creased by more than one-third between 1993 and 1994, and
these firms display a positive 1994 coefficient on profit.
No firms moved across categories between 1994 and
1995 except for firms that moved from the state-owned/state
enterprise category to other unidentifiable groups. During
the 1994–1995 period, the Czech economy also achieved
the most rapid rate of growth of GDP (6%) in all of the
1990s. In our 1995 estimates, we do not observe any
significant negative profit coefficients, although the coeffi-
cients for private/joint-stock firms and state-owned/state
enterprises are zero and hence consistent with the soft
budget constraint. Interestingly, we find a positive coeffi-
cient on profit for state and mixed/joint-stock firms, as well
as for private/limited-liability firms and cooperatives. With
the economy booming and the Czech prime minister declar-
ing the transition to be over, the banks may have hardened
the budget constraint for some categories of firms.
In 1996–1999, the Czech economy experienced an unex-
pected recession, and in 1996 the banks again relaxed the
budget constraint for state-owned firms, in part under polit-
ical pressure. With hundreds of firms moving from state to
mixed and private ownership between 1995 and 1996, the
estimates for 1996 in table 7 indicate that investment was
again negatively related to profits in state and mixed/joint-
stock companies, as well as in state-owned/state enter-
prises.41 Between 1996 and 1997, more than 150 firms
moved from state and mixed ownership to the private/joint-
stock category, where the 1997 and 1998 coefficients on
profit turned negative. It is likely that this switch to a strong
soft budget constraint in the private/joint-stock firms in
1997–1998 reflected the sizable inflow of firms that oper-
ated under a strong soft budget constraint in their original
categories of firms in 1996. At the same time, as the banking
crisis developed in 1997–1998, cooperatives, and, to a lesser
extent, also private/limited-liability companies appear to
have operated under a credit crunch.
Overall, the disaggregated annual estimates in table 7
suggest that, during most of the 1993–1998 period, the
current and former state-owned firms operated under a soft
budget constraint. In contrast, cooperatives and, to a lesser
extent, the private/limited-liability companies appear to
have been credit rationed.
As the last step in our analysis of the soft budget con-
straints, we have checked various measures of the propen-
sity to invest of profitable and unprofitable firms. We started
by comparing annual data on the investment-capital, invest-
ment-output, and investment-labor ratios of firms with pos-
itive and negative annual profit. We found that the differ-
ence was statistically insignificant for all three measures in
all years. Second, to eliminate the effect of outliers, we
replicated these tests for trimmed samples, where we com-
pared only profitable and loss-making firms that were within
two standard deviations of their respective means. Again,
37 As mentioned earlier, there is also a negative coefficient on profit in
the case of private/individual firms. This is most likely associated with the
heavy investment in the early phase of the life cycle of these firms when
profit is low or negative.
38 The state-owned firms became numerically relatively insignificant in
1997 and especially 1998.
39 State enterprises were usually assigned a new identification number as
they switched their legal status.
40 Between 1993 and 1994, 33 firms also moved into the category of
state-owned/joint-stock companies, with eighteen coming from the pri-
vate/joint-stock and fifteen from the mixed/joint-stock category. The
movement into state ownership could reflect a number of phenomena,
including an increase in the firm’s basic capital, with the state becoming
a majority owner by contributing more than the other owner(s) of the firm.
As mentioned, throughout the 1990s there was also a movement of firms
from the state-owned/state enterprise category, much of which went to the
state-owned/joint-stock company group. The reader can surmise this flow
from the changes in the number of firms in these two categories over the
years. However, because this switch was accompanied by a change in the
firm’s identification number, we cannot detect it directly.
41 However, it was positive in private/joint-stock and (the few) private/
individual firms.
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we found the difference to be statistically insignificant for
all three measures in all years. Third, to check if the
difference in investment rates between profitable and loss-
making firms reveals itself only over a period of several
years, we took firms that were present in our sample for at
least six years and we compared a six-year cumulative
propensity to invest of firms that had positive total profit and
those that had negative total profit over the six-year period.
Having found no statistically significant differences among
these two groups of firms, we then sharpened the test by
comparing only the highly profitable and highly loss-
making firms in this sample.42 Although the highly profit-
able firms had somewhat higher mean investment rates than
the loss-making firms, we again could not reject the hypoth-
esis that the rates were the same.43 Our findings hence
indicate that the loss-making firms had long-term access to
capital and on average were able to maintain investment
rates that were comparable with those of profitable firms.
This is strong complementary evidence that loss-making
firms operated under soft budget constraints, and it is
consistent with the observed lack of corporate bankruptcies
in the Czech Republic in the 1990s.
Finally, in table 8, we present estimated coefficients of
the dynamic structural model based on our entire sample of
firms. The model includes quarterly and ownership/legal
form dummy variables and the inverse Mills ratio. In view
of the difficulties that are frequently encountered in estimat-
ing this type of a model, our estimates are very encouraging
because the three structural coefficients—1, 2, and 3—
have the theoretically predicted signs and are statistically
significant. In addition to providing support to the static
neoclassical-accelerator model, the Czech data from the
post-1992 phase of the transition hence suggest that, in
terms of investment, the firms started behaving consistently
with intertemporal profit maximization.
V. Conclusions
Strategic restructuring of firms is viewed as key to a
successful transition from plan to market, with investment
under a hard budget constraint being a principal form of this
restructuring. In this paper, we have used the population of
medium-sized and large industrial firms operating in the
Czech Republic between 1992 and 1998 to analyze the
investment behavior of firms with various types of owner-
ship and legal (corporate) status. Ours is one of the first
studies in this area, and it differs from other studies in that
we (i) examine the validity of the main competing models of
investment in the transition context, (ii) test for the presence
of credit rationing and a soft budget constraint, (iii) assess
whether investment behavior of firms changes as the tran-
sition proceeds and whether it varies with a firm’s owner-
ship and legal status, (iv) use quarterly rather than annual
data in the presence of seasonal variation in investment, and
(v) apply panel data and sample selection techniques to the
firm-level data and thus eliminate aggregation and selectiv-
ity biases and control for heterogeneity across firms and
over time.
A comparison of the investment-capital, investment-
labor, and investment-production ratios across thirteen prin-
cipal ownership/legal form categories of firms during 1992–
1998 shows that (the relatively few) foreign-owned compa-
nies generally tend to invest the most and (the domestically
owned) cooperatives the least. Privately owned/joint-stock
companies tend to rank after the foreign-owned firms in
terms of their propensity to invest, followed by state-owned/
joint-stock companies. However, the general picture is com-
plex, as some domestic firms dominate foreign ones for
some criteria in some years, and some state-owned firms
dominate privately or foreign-owned ones in some cases. In
particular, by 1994 and 1995, state-owned/limited-liability
companies dominated all domestic, private firms in terms of
the investment-production ratio. Moreover, throughout
1992–1998, the privately-owned/limited-liability compa-
nies (the most numerous group of firms) and private indi-
vidually owned firms tended to invest little relative to their
output and employment. The findings from our large data
set hence contrast with the widely accepted findings of the
relatively small Polish survey (Belka et al., 1994), which
suggested that investment during the transition was high in
the new private firms and low in the state-owned enter-
prises.
Our econometric tests based on data from all firms
indicate that overall investment behavior may be approxi-
mated by the neoclassical-accelerator model. Estimates for
42 The highly profitable firms were defined as those with cumulative
capital-weighted profits greater than 1 (cumulative profits exceeded the
value of capital), whereas the highly loss-making firms had cumulative
capital weighted profits less than 1 (cumulative losses exceeded the
value of capital).
43 For example, the six-year investment-to-output ratios and correspond-
ing standard errors were 0.08 (0.08) for the highly profitable firms and
0.06 (0.06) for the highly loss-making firms.













***  significant at 1% level
**  significant at 5% level
*  significant at 10% level
Estimates of the dynamic investment function are based on the entire sample. The specification
includes the inverse Mills ratio (estimated parameter associated with it is denoted ) to control for the
possible selection bias. Model contained quarterly and ownership/legal form dummy variables to control
for a possible shift across ownership/legal categories (parameter vector , none of the ownership/legal
dummy coefficients was significant). Estimates are based on the deviations from the individual firm
means. We have used labor/capital, product/capital, wage times labor/capital, product minus wage times
labor/capital, and all dummy variables as instruments. All instruments except the dummy variables are
in the form of first and second power of lagged values of the deviation from the individual means. The
p-value of the F-test of overidentifying restrictions was 0.96.
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individual types of firms in turn show that most firms
behave consistently with this model, and, when we estimate
on successive biennial subperiods of data, we find that the
support for the neoclassical-accelerator model grows over
time. More generally, our results are similar to those from
western economies in that we find output to be an important
determinant of investment and the investment behavior of
firms in the Czech Republic to be consistent with both the
static (neoclassical-accelerator) and dynamic models of a
profit-maximizing firm.
The fact that we find a positive relationship between
profit and investment in only cooperatives and to a lesser
extent the smaller private firms supports the view that these
firms encounter financing constraints. However, the lack of
a strong positive link between profit and investment across
the broad range of firms casts doubt on the validity of the
Calvo-Coricelli hypothesis that stresses a positive relation-
ship between credit rationing and aggregate investment and
output. In fact, our results suggest that larger firms had
virtually unlimited access to capital, and in many years it
was the less profitable (more loss-making) state and former
state-owned firms that received more bank credit and in-
vested at a higher rate, ceteris paribus, than their more
profitable counterparts. Taken together with the facts that
the Czech banks accumulated a large portfolio of nonper-
forming loans, large firms had a high propensity to invest,
and by the mid-to-late 1990s many of them reached the
verge of bankruptcy, these findings suggest that throughout
the 1990s many large firms operated under a soft budget
constraint.
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TABLE A1.—NUMBER AND FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF FIRMS BY LEGAL STATUS
Legal Form 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total
Joint Stock Company 3036 3124 4633 4124 4256 5225 4400 28798
[3.63] [3.74] [5.55] [4.94] [5.09] [6.25] [5.27] [34.47]
State Enterprise (SOE) 2393 2395 1203 482 295 282 124 7174
[2.86] [2.87] [1.44] [0.58] [0.35] [0.34] [0.15] [8.59]
Limited Liability (Ltd.) 2459 3414 6920 3165 3410 13277 3412 36057
[2.94] [4.09] [8.28] [3.79] [4.08] [15.89] [4.08] [43.16]
Cooperative 959 984 1030 590 534 937 431 5465
[1.15] [1.18] [1.23] [0.71] [0.64] [1.12] [0.52] [6.54]
Individual 393 508 705 139 123 3290 208 5366
[0.47] [0.61] [0.84] [0.17] [0.15] [3.94] [0.25] [6.42]
Other 44 61 96 67 80 225 106 679
[0.06] [0.08] [0.12] [0.08] [0.09] [0.27] [0.12] [0.81]
Total 9284 10486 14587 8567 8698 23236 8681 83539
[11.11] [12.55] [17.46] [10.26] [10.41] [27.81] [10.39] [100.00]
Relative frequency in percentage is denoted in brackets.
TABLE A2.—NUMBER AND FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF FIRMS BY OWNERSHIP
Ownership 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total
Private 2795 3787 7376 3541 4326 16683 4919 43427
[3.35] [4.53] [8.83] [4.24] [5.18] [19.97] [5.89] [51.98]
State 4968 5012 4550 3438 791 755 457 19971
[5.95] [6.00] [5.45] [4.12] [0.95] [0.90] [0.55] [23.91]
Cooperative 964 990 1027 590 534 937 431 5473
[1.15] [1.19] [1.23] [0.71] [0.64] [1.12] [0.52] [6.55]
Foreign 390 505 1156 657 1114 3231 1515 8568
[0.47] [0.60] [1.38] [0.79] [1.33] [3.87] [1.81] [10.26]
Mixed 151 176 371 322 1925 1603 1334 5882
[0.18] [0.21] [0.44] [0.39] [2.30] [1.92] [1.60] [7.04]
Other 16 16 107 19 8 27 25 218
[0.02] [0.02] [0.13] [0.02] [0.01] [0.03] [0.03] [0.26]
Total 9284 10486 14587 8567 8698 23236 8681 83539
[11.11] [12.55] [17.46] [10.26] [10.41] [27.81] [10.39] [100.00]
Relative frequency in percentage is denoted in brackets.
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